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Abstract  
This study obtains a set of guidelines with which IS designers can achieve regulatory compliance with 
data retention requirements. Previous work has explored how to assess compliance threats and to 
visualize the outcome of policies enforcement but has failed to address how regulatory compliance 
involves multiple agents seeking to optimize their individual payoffs. We propose a typology that 
acknowledges in the enterprise business model the return on investment of agents affected by the new 
controls. Such agents are assumed to be co-opeting, i.e. they gain by cooperating, even if they have 
different goals. Grounded in control theory and the technology acceptance model, our conceptual 
design and its implementation represent an economically viable way to align business, legal and IT 
requirements concerning regulatory compliance with data retention requirements. 
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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In this study we intend compliance as “the act of adhering to, and the ability to demonstrate adherence 
to, mandated requirements resulting from contractual obligations and internal policies” (OECG, 2009). 
Should these policies and standards not be observed, “compliance risk” arises, as described by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005). Therefore compliance is part of a larger process 
known as Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC), which includes the definition of policies 
(governance) and the mitigation of compliance risk (risk management).  
Recent financial scandals have shown the cost for the enterprise of incidents due to a lack of 
compliance, which can be measured with a metric called Total Cost of Failure (Kahn and Blair, 2004). 
On the other hand in recent years the Total Cost of Ownership of controls for regulatory compliance 
can be significantly high. The regulatory risk has even topped the list of business threats perceived by 
managers (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005) although some studies (e.g. IT Compliance Policy 
Group, 2008) report an increase of performance for those who excel in compliance management. 
Software is there to respond to different compliance needs (McClean, 2009) but it is up to the 
enterprise to define its requirements, knowing that it does not one single and comprehensive GRC 
solution.  
In the rest of the paper we focus on regulatory requirements concerning information systems for data 
retention in multinational companies belonging to the financial sector. We believe such problem can 
be classed as “wicked” (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 81) when an enterprise deals with different businesses 
in different countries and it has to comply with multiple regulations, which have ambiguous, 
constantly evolving and sometime conflicting requirements (e.g. the Patriot Act is an American law 
that requires Swiss banks in U.S. to share data about its customers with American authorities to 
prevent terrorism; yet the Swiss bank has also to comply with the Swiss regulations concerning 
customers privacy). Therefore we adopt a design science approach to address such wicked problem.  
Accordingly to what said so far our research question is: How to design information systems for 
sustainable data retention regulatory compliance among co-opeting agents in heavy regulated 
business sectors, e.g. multinational financial institutions?  
 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Two main streams of design research have addressed the GRC process: (1) a requirement engineering 
oriented and (2) a business process oriented. The first stream deals with the first three steps of security 
management decision process of Straub and Welke (1998) -i.e. risk identification, risk analysis and 
options analysis - and it tries to achieve compliance by design. Among the large set of papers in this 
field we refer here only to Giblin et al. (2006), who proposed a solution to pass from enterprise 
policies to formal requirements, and to Jureta et al. (2010)'s theory of regulatory compliance for 
requirements engineering. We also acknowledge the existence of IT solutions on the market, as 
described by Butler and McGovern (2009). Hence once all stakeholders requirements are formalized 
in order to minimize further adaptations and to achieve compliance by design, cost of controls are 
claimed to be reduced and this recalls the theoretical claim of the property right approach (Hart and 
Moore, 1990). 
The second stream of research deals with the last two steps of the process. Again, among the many 
papers that should be cited we refer here to the work of Hoffman et al. (2009) for compliance checking 
and to Bellamy et al. (2007) for compliance visualization. We also acknowledge the existence of a 
large set of IT solutions on the market for automatic control and we refer to Rasmussen (2006) for a 
rough classification. Hence a system is created to automatically collect all user's actions and perform 
data mining for compliance verification. According to transaction cost theory the gain is claimed to 
reduce cost of formalization at the requirement level and to increase quality of the process that is 
controlled. 
Once we performed our literature review we have grounded our assessments into practice by 
performing a four-month full-time internship in the IT compliance team of a major financial institution 
headquartered in Switzerland. To define controls and rules required, the compliance officer is 
expected to have a clear understanding of law, business and Information Technology (IT) domains. 
From our experience we believe that the existing research has missed to spot three major issues: 
(1) The “risk” in business management is a requirement with a return on investment. The decision to 
comply with a regulation should be seen rather as an option with a cost and expected profits in the 
future. Therefore we derive the following research sub-question.  
RSQ1: How to design sustainable data retention compliance management systems? 
(2) We lack a design theory for IT GRC that describes what happens among multiple entities involved, 
whose intended behavior is neither of conformity nor of deviance. This appears to us as a situation 
where all actors gain by cooperating, even if they have different goals, as the one described by 
Nalebuff and Branderburger (1998). Therefore we derive the following research sub-question.  
RSQ2: Which are the business model components of a trusted-third party in charge of reducing 
compliance management cost among co-opeting agents? 
(3) Compliance should be represented in the business model as a question of alignment. Since 
compliance is perceived by many enterprises as a strategic threat, the IT-Law alignment should 
include the enterprise business model to avoid most compliance risk and reduce the number of 
required process controls. Therefore we derive the following research sub-question.  
RSQ3: How to design sustainable specifications for compliance management among co-opeting 
agents? 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
According to Hevner et al. (2004:7) design science 'creates and evaluates IT artifacts intended to solve 
identified organizational problems'. Therefore our process starts with an organizational problem and 
end with the evaluation of an artifact. Gregor and Jones (2007) go beyond the assumption concerning 
the advantages of a rigorous process and suggest design research should deliver a theory at the end 
that extends boundaries beyond the context for which the artifact was developed. 
 
Figure 1. The four loops in our iterative research methodology. 
Our starting point is the process proposed by Peffers et al. (2007:54), which has six steps (Identify 
problem and motivate, Define objective of a solution, Design and Development, Demonstration, 
Evaluation, Communication). Such process is composed by iterative cycles and has four “entry 
points”, i.e. the researcher can start its research at any step ranging from 1 to 4 depending on the initial 
conditions. If a design researcher deals with wicked problems, then the four entry points of Peffers et 
al. (2007) can be seen as maturity level of the same process, which can only go backward if the 
evaluation stage falsifies previous claims. Such entry points recall the four phases of the approach 
proposed by Holstrom et al. (2009), which has two exploratory and two explanatory phases. We kept 
the same name of the tasks that have been used by Peffers et al. (2007). Each iteration occupies a line, 
associated with a phase of Holstrom et al. (2009). The dashed arrows represent the flows that occur in 
case the validation phase falsifies the previous results and it refers to the different kind of contribution 
listed in Locke and Golden-Biddle (1997:1043): addressing incompleteness (F1), inadequacy (F2) or 
incommensurability (F3). In the following paragraphs we briefly illustrate what has been done in each 
loop. The results of each loop are going to be presented more in details in the following section. 
3.1 Loop 1: Development of an initial solution design 
We started by identifying the problem and by motivating the interest of the research community. We 
wished to address the first gap in the literature and to understand how to design sustainable 
compliance management systems (RSQ1). The second step in the first loop, i.e. the definitions of the 
objectives for a solution, also called meta-requirements, was performed with the IT compliance 
officer. Then we performed action research (Stringer, 1996) to design an artifact to address the 
problem. In our case the artifact took the shape of a method (the IT GRC workflow) to align business-
regulatory and IT requirements. The evaluation of the artifact was descriptive and the results of the 
first loop were presented to the research community at the workshops of two IS conferences (ICIS and 
CAISE). 
3.2 Loop 2: Refinement of the initial solution design 
Once the research community had been acknowledged of the outcomes and feedback had been 
collected the second loop started. More detailed problem analyses were performed and we extended 
our scope to economically viable compliance systems among coopeting companies, such as IT 
outsourcing and open innovation. Hence we performed action research by taking part to a three-month 
project with a second financial institution. We developed a business model of a third-party in charge 
of aligning the co-opeting agents. Once again the evaluation of the business model came under the 
shape of experts opinions from the financial institution. The outcomes have been presented in a 
workshop of AIS on co-opetition in open innovation and the article has been selected for fast-track by 
the International Journal of E-Services and Mobile Applications, and it is in its last round before 
publication. 
3.3 Loop 3: Development of substantive theory 
Since the results of the second evaluation were consistent with the previous ones, we tried to develop a 
substantive theory. We initially decided to focus only on data retention for privacy management. This 
time we worked with a major mobile handsets producer in the telecommunication business, i.e. 
beyond the financial domain. The theory we aimed to develop in this loop was a mid-range theory 
under the shape of typology of control actions. We followed the telecommunication firm training 
course for application programmers and we developed a prototype for privacy management to 
instantiate a set of control actions for privacy. The description of the prototype has been accepted as a 
chapter for a book on privacy protection measures and technologies in business organizations. The 
chosen approach in this loop was action design research (Sein et al. 2011), which is more theory 
oriented and takes more into account the organizational dimension of the firm. Such approach has 
been used in two other projects: (1) a multiple case study analysis to derive a typology of IT GRC 
strategy and (2) a case study within a strategic consultancy to assess the impact of contract design that 
increases the chance of client and consultant’s compliance. 
 3.4 Loop 4: Development of formal theory 
The fourth iteration quantitatively tested the typology of control processes for data retention regulatory 
compliance, with a special interest in privacy management. Our main goal was to assess the likelihood 
of success among mobile users of a set of strategies to privacy regulatory compliance. Since our test 
implied causality we controlled for endogeneity by combining the different control strategies and by 
obtaining a set of scenario-based surveys. The surveys were given to a large sample (n>150) of mobile 
users and we assessed the difference in response among respondent groups. Once the different effects 
of the control actions were assessed we derived a set of business model suggestions for firms in the 
telecommunication business sector. The formal theory has been briefly presented at the first workshop 
on mobile business models, whereas the results of the test are about to be published in the special issue 
on mobile business models of the Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research. 
4 RESULTS 
We start illustrating our results by introducing the concept of ontological distance with the words of 
Rosemann et al. (2004, p.440): “a label for the extent of the difference between the capabilities 
embedded within an [Enterprise System] package and the capabilities that an organization needs to be 
able to operate effectively and efficiently.» In the case of regulatory compliance a company needs to 
minimize the ontological distance among the three business, IT and regulatory dimensions, which for 
simplicity we associate here to three agents (one manager per each dimension). We believe that such 
distance is due to diverging goals among agents, whose behaviors can be described using the Colby 
and Kohlberg (1987) levels of moral perspective. It can be deviance (to not respect the rules), 
conformity (to fully agree with the rules) or something in between such as compliance (to respect the 
rules, even if one does not agree), which is the most likely to occur. Since compliance is a process 
among coopeting agents, we assume that ontological distance among agents has the tendency to 
increase over time, unless someone is in charge of aligning the agents’ goals. 
4.1 The IT GRC methodology 
Our IT GRC methodology is composed of three cycles. The IT governance cycle is in charge of 
identifying the business opportunity and threats and to steer the firm accordingly to minimize the 
business risk. The IT risk management cycle is in charge of minimizing the impact of technological 
(e.g. security) threats over the goals of the company. The compliance management cycle is in charge 
of assuring that the directives coming from the governance management cycle are understood and 
executed by risk management cycle, therefore minimizing the regulatory risk. Recalling the alliance 
management theory of Das and Teng (2001) we claim that agent's perceived ontological distance can 
be split into agent's perceived regulatory, technological and business risk, which interact among each 
other. In recent years many IT GRC model appeared but our methodology is still the only one that 
consider compliance management as between governance and risk management, recognizing its 
alignment task in addition to control management. 
4.2 Business model of a third party for IT GRC 
By combining the existing literature in system dynamics, resources-based view, transaction cost and 
game theories we used the business model ontology of Osterlwader et al. (2005) to obtain the business 
model components of a third-party agent above. Our claim is that such trusted third-party can align the 
coopeting agents’ goal into a self-enforcing contract that reduces the agents' perceived ontological 
distance. Existing research has already proposed different control strategies for infomediaries, and we 
limited here to cite the most recent work (Koch and Shultze, 2011). But we believe we extend such 
models by underlying the alignment of third-party value proposition and co-opeting agents’ goals; the 
required level of trust that the third-party has to acquire by having certifications; the required key 
resources that the third-party needs to possess to enable the control strategies to derive an overview of 
the expected profit and cost of the third party. 
4.3 Typology of control actions 
Our typology has three main dimensions: regulatory certification, technological solution (process + 
information technology) and expected return on investment (e.g. profit from avoided legal fee and 
operational efficiency – cost of technological solution and missed business opportunities). The 
interactions among the three dimensions can be derived by the theory of Das and Teng (2001) but we 
are interested here in finding the equilibrium among the three dimensions, since represent an exchange 
among agents (certification in exchange of technology – technology in exchange of investment – 
investment in exchange of certification), which has been underlined in the business model of the third 
party. Therefore we claim that a self-enforcing contract aligns the agents' legal, technological and 
business goals. The combinations of the three dimensions leads to a set of ideal types, which results in 
different degree of agent’s perceived ontological distance. The purpose of the third-party is to create 
these ideal types and to assess which of them are really applied in practice. This idea extends the 
existing goal-oriented requirement engineering approaches, since our approach is mostly decentralized 
and routed in information economics theory. 
5 Testing the typology 
The regulatory requirement elicitation and the compliance certification are the bottleneck of the 
current compliance management cycle. Therefore we tested a solution that allows the ideal types to be 
extracted by a crowd by a third-party, which can use the crowd also to test the ideal type’s likelihood 
of usage. In our test we fixed the regulatory certification to a privacy regulation in U.K., we checked 
three different approaches: reduction of collected data, increase of data protection, increase of 
distributive justice (to exchange the user data with some non-monetary benefit). In our case the co-
opeting agents were the mobile user that sends data and the mobile provider that collects the data. As 
it turns out different groups of mobile users give different scores to these approaches we derived a 
business model for a third-party in charge of obfuscating the identity of some mobile users and of 
assuring a proper compensation for the users that are less concerned about privacy. That leads us to 
claim that self-enforcing contracts goals can be increased by agents' goals elicitated by agents' 
perceived ontological distance. This extends the works of information systems researchers grounded in 
psychology, e.g. Cavusoglu et al. (2010), since our intent is to use quantitative results to derive 
business models prescriptions. 
6 CONTRIBUTIONS  
Since there is always a tension among practitioners’ relevance and theoretical rigor we list a set of 
suggestions for IT GRC experts, which we derive from our work 
Stop hesitating between “control everything” and “trust everyone” strategies. Carefully choose the 
control level that your firm needs: Our IT methodology shows how agent's perceived ontological 
distance that leads to coopetition can be split into agent's perceived regulatory, technological and 
business risk. 
Consider the possibility of adding a trusted third-party to decrease compliance management cost: Our 
third-party business model shows that a self-enforcing contract by a trusted third-party reduces in time 
the agents' perceived ontological distance 
Do not focus only on control: A self-enforcing contract align the agents' legal, technological and 
business goals 
Reduce the cost of compliance management by relying on crowdsourcing to conceive and test the 
control action ideal types: our test on control ideal types shows that self-enforcing contracts goals can 
be elicitated by agents' perceived ontological distance. 
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